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The World as the American Frontier: 
Racialized War Rhetoric 
 
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush labeled the U.S. 
response a “War on Terror,” asserting “Americans have known wars—but for the past 136 years 
they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941.”1 This rather curious 
statement went unremarked in the media, although its specificity testifies to its importance. The 
reference, of course, is to the Civil War, which for Bush, and with the exception of the attack on 
Pearl Harbor and other American territories in 1941, constituted the last time troops engaged on 
American soil. It is a routine observation; it is also patently false. Following the Civil War, 
American settlers and the military that supported them sped west, pushing indigenous nations out 
of their own lands and into the territories held by other Indian peoples, turning a centuries’ old 
set of relationships based on trade, cultural adaptation, and intermittent conflict into an 
unrelentingly violent war of cultural and physical annihilation.2 From 1865 to 1890, the U.S. 
military fought Indian nations from the Central Plains and the upper Midwest to the West Coast 
and the borders with Mexico and Canada. From the Battle of the Little Bighorn in 1876 and the 
death of Oglala Lakota Crazy Horse in 1877 to the pursuit and eventual surrender of Geronimo 
in 1886 and until the Massacre at Wounded Knee in 1890 symbolized the end of the “Indian 
Wars,” the nation was at continual war on its western frontiers. Despite the prevalence and 
significance of these on-going conflicts, contemporary presidents consistently fail to 
acknowledge the Indian Wars. We argue here that while the Indian Wars go unmentioned in 
contemporary presidential rhetoric in general and in regards to the War on Terror in particular,  a 
focus on the racial underpinnings of those wars nuances what we know about war rhetoric and 
the historical relationship between race and war in the United States. 
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Viewing the War on Terror through the lens provided by the rhetoric in the Indian Wars 
draws specific attention to its racialized elements. While it can be legitimately argued, for 
instance, that in many ways “terrorist” has simply replaced “communist” in the national 
imagination, and that the pathologies we detail here can be seen throughout the Cold War and are 
well understood in the literature, we argue that there are racial elements in rhetoric of both the 
Indian Wars and the War on Terror that are absent from Cold War rhetoric and also from most 
studies of war rhetoric.3 Scholars, have, of course, examined the racialized nature of the War of 
Terror. Dana Cloud, for example, has pointed to the ways in which the “clash of civilization” 
rhetoric has framed our understanding of intervention in Afghanistan.4 Jasmine Jirwani and 
Gargi S. Bhattacharyya have separately examined the ways in which the rhetoric in the War on 
Terror has evoked specific ideologies concerning race and gender.5 We hope to add to that 
conversation by drawing specific parallels between these recent wars and previous incarnations 
of racialized war rhetoric, noting the ways in which the past recurs in the present and language 
recalling that past brings with it entailments that sit uncomfortably in our contemporary 
understanding of ourselves. In their rhetoric on the War on Terror, both Democratic and 
Republican presidents, white and black, stake a claim to global power based on their ability to 
contain and control a racialized threat and, in the process, offer rhetorical protection to a racial 
hierarchy at home and abroad.  
 Specifically, we argue that the Indian Wars provide an important parallel for the ways 
presidents articulate the national mission in the War on Terror. Presidential rhetoric during the 
Indian Wars depended on particular understandings of the national enemy viewed through their 
reliance on the frontier myth.6 Like all myths, the frontier myth appeared as colloquial common 
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sense and served to “validate a certain social order” and instruct the community’s future 
decision-making, actions, and beliefs.7 The frontier myth is shorthand for the story of American 
progress, expansion, and the conquering of the west.8 This myth, Richard Slotkin argues, is “our 
oldest and most characteristic myth, expressed in a body of literature, folklore, ritual, 
historiography, and polemics produced over a period of three centuries.”9 The myth tells the 
story of white American settlers who valued civilization, community, and democracy, moved 
west, triumphed over American Indians, and tamed the frontier.10 It explains the establishment of 
American colonies, and accounts for America’s emergence as a nation-state, its economic 
growth, and its process of modernization.11 Just as the frontier myth justified the Indian Wars, 
presidents draw upon the same markers of national identity implicit in that myth to justify the 
War on Terror. Presidents once positioned themselves as Indian fighters and the west as their 
frontier; they now position themselves as “terrorist” fighters and the world is their frontier.12  
We use the frontier myth and the rhetoric of the Indian Wars as a heuristic for 
understanding presidential rhetoric on the War on Terror, finding four elements in this rhetoric 
useful to understanding contemporary presidential war rhetoric. First, just as the word “Indian” 
collapses the members of a number of different cultures and nations into one seemingly coherent 
entity, the term “terrorist” functions in much the same way.13 The enemy named in both 
instances is magnified and rendered formless, amplifying the potential threat and justifying a 
similarly amplified reaction.14 Second, the war zone in both instances is characterized by shifting 
borders and alliances. The battleground in the War on Terror is similar to the Western frontier in 
that no clean line moved west. Similarly, terrorists can be found in any geographic location. Like 
Indians, they are both inside and outside of American held territory, and pose a double threat 
which authorizes a broad scope of presidential action. Third, presidents favor “technology” over 
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“trickery.” The U.S. government relies on superior weaponry while characterizing its opponent 
as relying on deception, setting up an understanding of the distinction between savagery and 
civilization such that technology and not behavior becomes the standard of judgment and 
authorizing the use of force. Fourth, the declared ends of both Indian Wars and the War on 
Terror are democratization, civilization, and assimilation. War in both instances is understood as 
bringing civilization to the world through violent means and violence is thus justified as 
democratic action. Examining the rhetoric of the War on Terror through the lens of the Indian 
Wars, then, focuses attention on the ways in which these conflicts are racialized. It highlights the 
mechanism through which this rhetoric authorizes presidential power exercised through violence 
with global scope, and adds to our understanding of war rhetoric in general. We make our 
argument by explaining how these four elements characterize the rhetoric surrounding the War 
on Terror and conclude with a discussion of how the centrality of racialized warrants for 
exercises of presidential power inflects the use of that power at home and abroad.  
Authorizing Power: Presidents as Indian and Terrorist Fighters 
 
Indian fighting long served as a source of legitimacy for American political leaders and 
also as a warrant for presidential leadership. George Washington became well-known as a result 
of his actions in the French and Indian War. Andrew Jackson, of course, was the nation’s most 
famous Indian fighter, not only valorized for his violence toward indigenous nations during his 
years of service in the military but continuing it while in the executive office.15 Other presidents 
also relied on their prowess as Indian fighters, including William Henry Harrison, who rode into 
office in 1840 on the basis of his defeat of the Tecumseh and the Shawnee alliance (“Tippecanoe 
and Tyler too”) and Zachary Taylor, whose career included actions against Indians from 
Minnesota and Wisconsin through Kansas and into Florida.16 The ability to subdue the savage 
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enemy was, for a time at least, a significant responsibility for American presidents, and those 
who did not directly engage this enemy on the battlefield continued the war through means such 
as treaties requiring Indian removal, trade policies that led to Indian debt repayable in land, and 
policies aimed at facilitating what they considered to be the inevitable demise of Indian nations 
in the face of advancing “American” civilization.17  
Throughout the nation’s history, presidents symbolically and materially acted as defenders 
of the nation against its most important constitutive threat.18 Both enacting and reinscribing the 
frontier myth, U.S. presidents invoked the idea that national actions were taken in defense of 
“civilization,” always represented by the central government. No matter how violent, no matter 
how destructive, action ranging from massacre and murder to allotment, presidents justified 
forced assimilation and cultural destruction were as necessary to further “America’s” purpose in 
the world.19  
As the frontier closed and the nation’s territory became increasingly secure within defined 
borders, the need for presidents to represent the nation’s military prowess did not abate. As a 
number of scholars have demonstrated, U.S. presidents throughout the twentieth century were 
expected to have served in the nation’s military, and to defend that military politically.20 
Presidents once authorized their leadership as Indian fighters. More recently, they endeavored to 
appear “tough on communism.” The circle has, since George Bush’s presidency, come back 
around and presidential toughness is now on display against terrorists, who, like Indians, are 
understood as a unified and undifferentiated mass, able to move treacherously across borders. 
That mobility and the lack of stability it implies give terrorists-as-Indians the ability to resist the 
otherwise superior technology associated with civilization. That resistance, however, is depicted 
as temporary. The American teleology insists on its eventual victory understood as the expansion 
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and protection of democracy through the assimilation of the less civilized into the group of 
democratic peoples. War rhetoric always includes an argument that the enemy is savage. But not 
all war rhetoric racializes the savage enemy in the way that the rhetoric of the Indian Wars and 
the War on Terror do. By focusing specifically on these racial elements, we add to our 
understanding of war rhetoric and of the hierarchies it supports at home and abroad. There are at 
least four valences through which this racialization can be understood: collapsing identities, 
permeating borders, wielding technology, and defining the ends of conflict. 
Collapsing Identities  
 
 The word “Indian” is more than simply a misnomer begun by Christopher Columbus’ 
ignorance and misunderstanding.21 It conflates the members of over five hundred nations, 
numerous cultural and language groups, and residents of a variety of geographic locations into a 
single, undifferentiated mass. Culturally, geographically, linguistically, and genetically, for 
instance, the Seminole of Florida have little in common with the Anishanaabe of Minnesota, the 
Onondaga of New York or the Diné of the Southwest. They do, however, share a history of 
invasion, genocide, and oppression, authorized by the word “Indian,” for the assumption was that 
regardless of the manifest differences among and between them, all Indians were essentially the 
same—essentially enemies, who were alike in all of the fundamentals differentiating savagery 
from civilization. Settlers who wanted Indian land brought with them specific racial hierarchies 
that were adapted and applied to their new environment. Delimiting all indigenous peoples as 
singularly “Indian” facilitated the application of those hierarchies and authorized violence as a 
political tool of conquest. 
This conflation accomplishes other work as well as defining “the enemy.” Peaceful 
Indians, for instance, were always threatened by association with their more militant kin. They 
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could be presumed to be on the verge of war even when they were unarmed. 22 Indians who lived 
in settled farming communities were threatened with the loss of territory as they could be easily 
accused of failing to “use” their lands, since they were understood collectively as wandering 
nomads.23 Indians who governed themselves through matriarchies were threatened with treaty 
negotiations that took as their starting point a lack of respect for their political organization, since 
the common assumption was that all Indian nations were governed by “chiefs” and their women 
were maltreated.24  
During the Indian Wars, pioneers ignored the differences among indigenous nations, 
calling all of the nations and cultures “Indian.” Mary Stuckey notes that this “vocabulary 
problem” influenced and reinforced confusion about which native nations presidents were 
naming as enemies and which were friends.25 The conflation of all native peoples into one 
“Indian” category did more violence against American Indians than creating and reinforcing 
misunderstandings about which people non-American Indians should war against, though that 
was its most violent effect. In addition to psychological and cultural repercussions of this new 
identity, the naming of all natives as “Indians” contributed to the myth of white superiority, in 
which God’s will commanded that white settlers expand west, their success at the expense of any 
and all American Indian lives that were in the way.26 All American Indians, diverse peoples 
clumped into one linguistic identifier by white presidents and settlers, became unified into a 
single, undifferentiated mass threatening the lives and ambitions of white settlers. For instance, 
Leroy Dorsey and Rachel Harlow note that President Theodore Roosevelt’s telling of world 
history, steeped in the myth of the frontier, “demonstrated that success could depend, at least in 
part, on having the right bloodline.”27 The “right bloodline,” for Roosevelt, distinguished 
between various European immigrants. American Indians themselves were understood to be so 
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different from white pioneers they were rendered indistinguishable from one another. National 
hierarchies of race were thus established and maintained almost invisibly by conflating members 
of all Indian nations into one undifferentiated group through the label “Indian,” and marking 
membership in that group through their skin color. 
 Like “Indian,” the word “terrorist” collapses members of different cultures and nations into 
a single untrustworthy entity.  While on the one hand, media sources and political actors agree 
that “terrorists” can come from any country and any racial or ethnic background, the figure of the 
terrorist is frequently racialized in the public mind.28 Domestic “white” terrorists, for example, 
are treated as aberrant, and the assumption that “terrorists” are nonwhite is prevalent.29 
Presidents imagine the racialized enemy as a stable, clearly identifiable subject who must be 
conquered. While the Obama administration has been less expansive in its treatment of terrorists 
as an amorphous enemy than was Bush, fighting a war on “terror” is as imprecise as fighting a 
war on “Indians.” This imprecision now allows presidents to take whatever action they deem 
necessary anywhere in the world, just as any action was once authorized by the necessity of 
controlling indigenous people.   
 In his 9/1l address to the nation, for example, President Bush said, “The search is 
underway for those who are behind these evil acts. I’ve directed the full resources of our 
intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and to bring them to 
justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those 
who harbor them.”30  He put it more starkly in his September 20, 2001, address, saying, “And we 
will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation in every region now 
has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.”31 Those who harbor 
terrorists, like the “Indian lovers” of the frontier, risked the wrath of the national government. 
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Any individual or group of individuals who became too close to terrorists, like those who 
became too close to Indians, risked sharing their fate. If a people or even a region of people do 
not agree in conscience or abide in action with the U.S. position on the war, as articulated by 
Bush, they are implicated as being a part of this amorphous group of terrorists. “The only good 
Indian,” for General Philip Sheridan, was “a dead Indian.” Bush comes very close to articulating 
the same sentiment regarding those whom he defined as terrorists. In neither case was there any 
real effort to understand the wide variety of motives, the variance among behaviors, or the 
nuances that lie between motive and action. In the days of the frontier, the label “Indian” 
assigned motive and predicted behavior in much the same way that presidential uses of the label 
“terrorist” function for us today. 
 The Bush Administration’s logic of conflating non–white bodies onto a group of people 
who are either terrorists or potential terrorists was an important part of his justification for U.S. 
intervention in Iraq. In his 2003 State of the Union address, Bush invited his audience to imagine 
the great danger that Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, could have on the rest of the world: “Year 
after year, Saddam Hussein has gone to elaborate lengths, spent enormous sums, taken great 
risks to build and keep weapons of mass destruction. But why? The only possible explanation, 
the only possible use he could have for those weapons, is to dominate, intimidate, or attack.”32 
At least two important things happen in this part of Bush’s speech. First, there are no possible 
motives other than “to dominate, to intimidate, or to attack.” Like the Indians on the frontier, the 
idea that one might need weapons to defend oneself is not part of the calculation. Savages amass 
weapons in order to harm the innocent. The savagery of terrorists, like the savagery of Indians on 
the frontier, is inherent. Therefore, the strongest measures against these savages are not only 
justified, they are mandated. “Nits,” after all, “make lice.”33 Certainly, this kind of rhetoric is 
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always applied to enemies. But when it is applied to a racialized mass, it takes on even more 
ominous overtones than when it is applied to, say, Europeans, whether fascist or communist. 
When taken with the other elements discussed here, this amalgamation authorizes racialized 
understandings of the world and its conflicts, cementing them in ways that are difficult to 
challenge, at least in part because the associations are already ubiquitous.  
 Second, Bush implicates the entire citizenry of Iraq as part of the War on Terror because of 
the potential threat its leader represented. As with Indians on the frontier, terrorists are inherently 
violent, wait only for the right opportunity to enact that violence, and all Indians were as 
culpable as their leaders. Bush and members of his administration argued that Al Qaeda is “a 
collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations,” and that people and countries had only 
two option in the War on Terror: to be “with” the U.S., and thus, the decisions of the president, 
or to be “with the terrorists.” 34 It has become standard for presidents to argue in times of conflict 
that the U.S. has no problems with a nation’s citizens, only with its leaders. Presidents make 
conscious and clear efforts to distinguish between a mass public and an opposing nation’s 
leadership. In the case of Indians and “the axis of evil,” this tendency is much less in evidence, 
although efforts were made, for instance, immediately after 9/11 to create such distinctions. But 
because the War on Terror blurs the lines between state action and non-state action, these 
distinctions become equally unclear, and it is perilously easy to conflate all people, whether 
Shi’a, Sunni, or anyone else, as a potential threat.  
 This logic runs throughout Bush’s rhetoric. For instance, in his 2006 State of the Union 
Address, Bush said, “The Shi'a and Sunni extremists are different faces of the same totalitarian 
threat. Whatever slogans they chant when they slaughter the innocent, they have the same 
wicked purposes. They want to kill Americans, kill democracy in the Middle East, and gain the 
 11 
weapons to kill on an even more horrific scale.”35 Even given the (easy to overlook) modifier 
“extremists,” the logical leap that connected Shi’as, Sunnis, and anyone else who “want[s] to kill 
Americans,” is a large one indeed, and it is explicable through the same logic that allowed 
Americans on the frontier to understand all Indians as equally guilty: “they have the same 
wicked purposes.” This is, in many ways, standard war rhetoric; when placed in the context of a 
racialized enemy, it becomes part of a logic that helps to reinforce existing racial hierarchies.   
 This logic was partially undermined during the Obama administration. Obama’s language, 
while relying on similar logic, is less sweeping in its definition of who the “terrorists” are in the 
War on Terror. For example, Obama explained that the “just war” in which the U.S. must engage 
is not equivalent to what President Bush termed a “War on Terror,” but is instead something 
more precise—a war specifically against the terrorist groups al Qaeda and Taliban. This still 
allowed for amalgamation, especially in that both these groups cross borders and are assumed to 
operate as webs or networks, but Obama offered some sense that the threat was identifiable, 
containable, rather than extending to the entire region and encompassing entire peoples. Obama 
noted the seriousness of the threat posed by “resurgent al Qaeda and a Taliban taking over large 
parts of Afghanistan.”36 Even in Obama’s rhetoric, though, the specific enemy is unclear. In this 
speech alone, he implicates al Qaeda, its affiliates, and seemingly mysterious Taliban members 
throughout Afghanistan. When the fight is not against a nation-state’s official military regime, 
the “enemy” is necessarily amorphous, and its presence inside the borders of any nation, 
including those controlled by U.S. allies, is sufficient provocation for military action. 
The very vagueness of labels like “Indian” and “terrorist” do significant political work, 
for they appear to be merely descriptive but in certain contexts imply that certain actions 
regarding them are both necessary and required. Both terms collect a variety of individuals, who 
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may well have a variety of motives, and who may or may not be acting in any concerted fashion 
toward a shared end, into one large and frightening mass. Moreover, in this labeling they become 
other, strange, unknowable. They are not like us in any of the ways that count, for their actions 
are not depicted in presidential rhetoric in terms that make them knowable. These are depictions 
of non-white bodies, which serve both to justify violence against enemies and to reinscribe 
domestic racial hierarchies. Because of the ways that these depictions are naturalized within the 
existing national ideology, this process is at once very visible, acting as it does on non-white 
bodies, and, because of its consistency with prevailing ideology, also invisible.  
Shifting Borders and Alliances 
 
 The battleground during the Indian Wars was unclear. It shifted both temporally and 
geographically, and while the frontier is often understood as a single line marching relentlessly 
westward, that was not actually the case. Non-Indians made incursions into Indian Country; they 
were accommodated and resisted; settlements were formed in an uneven line, sometimes 
advancing, sometimes retreating. There was no clear demarcation along of the frontier of safe 
zones and unsafe zones. The entire frontier was often unsafe. Borders were unenforceable and 
territorial boundaries were fluid.37  
 Political relations on the frontier were complicated. Indigenous nations engaged in artful 
blends of negotiation, stalling, war, trade, and intermarriage as they tried to accommodate the 
incursion of settlers, trappers, and members of other, often displaced nations into their 
territories.38 The artistry of these negotiations were often lost on non-Indians, who were 
committed to a singularized view of Indians as “savages” and who therefore often 
misunderstood, misinterpreted, and abused the Indians. When alliances shifted, as they often did 
in on the fluid western frontier, what looked to Indians as strategic maneuvering in the face of 
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unprecedented threat looked to American political leaders like untrustworthy actions by 
undependable adversaries.39 
A minor threat anywhere along the frontier was often therefore understood as posing a 
threat to the nation’s capacity to ensure order anywhere on the frontier.40 The Indian Wars were 
amorphous in part because defeating one indigenous nation did not mean an end to the struggle. 
It meant that the struggle moved to a different frontier and became ever more complicated as 
Indian nations encroached on one another’s territory as they were encroached upon themselves. 
Nations that had histories of enmity might form lasting and temporary alliances or antagonisms 
might intensify under this new pressure. In either case, initial victories on the frontier often 
complicated rather than simplifying matters for the prosecutors of the Indian Wars.41 Wars are 
always tricky, but especially so when they are inflicted upon an “enemy” that is not limited to a 
particular geographic nation-state. When borders shifted in the Indian Wars and as they continue 
to shift in the War on Terror, they become wars without borders.42 
These borderless wars, however, are fought in specific kinds of territory. In the case of the 
Indian Wars, Euroamerican settlers encroached on land previously controlled by indigenous 
peoples, understood to be organized “tribally.” The same logic is frequently applied to the 
Middle East, where, especially in Afghanistan, tribal “war lords” prevent the development of 
stable government. The use of words like “tribal” and phrases like “war lord” denotes primitive 
forms of political organization inside of underdeveloped territories only sporadically 
controlled—areas that are therefore ripe for development after coming under more civilized 
control. These terms also denote a racialized political hierarchy in which stable and civilized 
governments associated with nation-states face off against unstable and disorganized racially 
territories controlled by non-white tribal leaders.    
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The prime goal in the Indian Wars was to extend governmental control over unorganized 
tribal territory. In the War on Terror, the goal is control over “terrorist” territory.  Bush, for 
instance, said “Our War on Terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end 
until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”43 Thus, “any 
nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism” would be “regarded by the United States as 
a hostile regime.”44 This frame remained in effect throughout the Bush presidency and continues 
into the Obama administration. In Obama’s first major speech on drone policy, for instance, 
Obama said that the world had seen “an emergence of various al Qaeda affiliates” and noted that 
they are located “from Yemen to Iraq and from Somalia to North Africa.” 45 In fact, according to 
Obama, the terrorist threat is now even more diffuse than it was when the war began, “with Al 
Qaeda’s affiliates in the Arabian Peninsula—AQAP—the most active in plotting against our 
homeland.”46  Obama argued here that the threat to the U.S. is no longer only from terrorists in 
other regions. The warzone shifted into the United States, which holds its own terrorists. The 
wider the area of conflict, the more dangerous the world becomes, and the more imperative it is 
that the nation authorizes a strong president, able to protect the nation on every part of its vast 
frontier.47 Racialized understandings of the problem become translated through the authorization 
of presidential power into a globalized version of domestic hierarchies.   
Obama’s claims enlarge the battlefield, declaring a war upon individuals in the U.S. who 
may have been “inspired by larger notions of violent jihad.” 48 As with Indians, the threat posed 
by terrorists is simultaneously internal and external. Obama said that “deranged and alienated 
individuals,” residing in the U.S., citizens or non-citizens alike, pose the “current threat.” 49 
These “homegrown terrorists” are the ones for which U.S. citizens should be concerned. It is one 
thing to fight a nation-state that has clear and identifiable borders—measuring the success of 
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such a campaign can be accomplished by territorial markers on maps. In many ways, the “Indian 
Wars” were understood in such ways, although the territory in question was in constant flux, 
requiring a mobile force with flexile mandates. The inchoate nature of the Indian Wars also 
justified the most extreme violence against Indians, including assaults upon entire villages, full 
of the elderly, the weak, and the young. Such violence was justified through the logic that they 
all Indians, because they were Indians, were equally guilty. In the War on Terror, territorial 
boundaries are also of doubtful relevance. The Obama administration is as likely to send drones 
into the territory of our allies such as Pakistan as into that of our declared enemies, such as that 
controlled by the Taliban. And the innocent, the weak, and the young are also likely to become 
collateral damage of those drone attacks. These measures are justified by the same imperatives 
that justified the flexible tactics and the violence of the U.S. military on the frontier: the enemy is 
fluid and dynamic, and if the nation fails to respond, its existence is threatened. With the security 
of the homeland at stake in an undefined way, extreme measures become not only reasonable, 
but imperative.   
Technology over Trickery 
 
 During the Indian Wars, the U.S. military could depend upon superior force, both in 
numbers and in technology. Presidents continue to favor technology while attributing trickery to 
the enemy in the War on Terror. Unlike moments such as World War II or the Cold War, when 
the enemy’s presumptive technological prowess increased the nature of the threat posed, in the 
Indian Wars and the War on Terror, the threat comes from a reliance on underhanded means 
from primitive others. In both instances, and in keeping with the national reliance on the myth of 
inherent progress as a marker of national superiority, presidents valorize advanced weaponry 
while characterizing opponents as relying on trickery. Presidents describe this superior 
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technology as being more moral and humane than that of Indians and terrorists. The morality of 
the weaponry then transfers to that of those who wield the weapons, making U.S. soldiers more 
humane than their enemies.  
 Certainly, the idea of Indians as perpetrators of conflict runs throughout the corpus of 
presidential rhetoric, and is consistent with the overall genre of war rhetoric in which the enemy 
is portrayed as a primitive, violent savage.50 In his first annual message, George Washington, for 
instance, found “reason to hope that the pacific measures adopted with regard to certain hostile 
tribes of Indians would have relieved the inhabitants of our southern and western frontiers from 
their depredations, but you will perceive from the information contained in the papers which I 
shall direct to be laid before you (comprehending a communication from the Commonwealth of 
Virginia) that we ought to be prepared to afford protection to those parts of the Union, and, if 
necessary, to punish aggressors.”51 Note that U.S. action was understood as “pacific,” while that 
of the Indians was variously seen as “hostile,” as “depredations,” and the Indians themselves 
were “aggressors.” Whites required “protection” against them. 
 Luckily for whites, such protection against Indians could be afforded by the government. 
Because of their inherent volatility and their lack of civilization, Indian victories were 
consistently attributed to some kind of trickery. Madison, for instance, depicted Indian weapons 
of choice as limited to the tomahawk, the hatchet, and the knife as well as the bow and arrow.52 
Whites were understood by Grant to be in need of protection from Indian “depredations,” 
launched without warning.53 These characterizations complemented the depictions of Indians as 
inherently savage, because if they were civilized, they would carry civilized weapons and 
conduct themselves, in war and peace, in a civilized and manner. The absence of any one of 
these elements indicated the absence of civilization.54   
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 Similarly, in contemporary warfare, some weapons are widely considered to be less 
“civilized” than others, a formulation that conflates “civilization” with “morality,” and is 
codified as international law in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which outlawed biological and 
chemical warfare.55 In the case of the War on Terror, U.S. presidents characterize enemy 
weapons are immoral in ways that vilify the enemy and garner support for U.S. military action. 
For instance, in 2006, Bush spoke at length of the horrors of improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs). Among the IED’s traits that Bush claims make them “weapons of fear” instead of, as 
Bush implies, legitimate weapons is their ability to “be hidden and detonated remotely.”56 
Instead of confronting the U.S. military face-to-face—the more civilized approach to warfare—
terrorists instead “turned to IEDs,” weapons that allow enemies to “attack from a safe distance 
without having to face [U.S.] forces in battle.”57 Attacking others from a position of safety is 
deemed here something akin to cowardice. It is certainly bereft of the honor traditionally 
associated with and highly valued by, members of the U.S. military.58 Like the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, to which the 9/11 attacks are frequently compared, a racial other used trickery to assail 
its civilized enemy. 
 Both the Indian Wars and the War on Terror were depicted in binary terms in which the 
U.S. national government was understood as unequivocally moral, representing civilization in its 
highest form and the inchoate enemy was depicted as immoral and uncivilized.  Unlike the 
rhetoric employed in some conflicts, in both the Indian Wars and in the War on Terror, 
technology became the marker for both morality and civilization. Ideologically, this does more 
than simply present the world as divided into “friends” and “enemies,” although it does do that. 
But this rhetoric also lays out the terms of judgment: those racial others who lack technology are 
placed in a different hierarchy through the vehicle of technology. 59  
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Violence on the part of the U.S., therefore, is both justified and reasonable. But because 
the U.S. represents the forces of civilization and humanity, that violence is not just preventative, 
it is also creative—through the violence of war, the U.S. can bring civilization and humanity to 
those who lack them. Through this hierarchy of terms implicit in the language of the Indian Wars 
and the War on Terror, American war-making generates civilization as it also generates and 
maintains the idea of Americans as inherently civilized. 
Democratization and Civilization as the Consequence of War 
 
Presidents in both the Indian Wars and the War on Terror label the point of the wars to be 
democratization, civilization, and assimilation. Presidents in both contexts justify war through 
the presumption and rhetorical construction of a savage other.60 These racialized savages, who 
attack their own people, are in need of democracy and civilization, which can only come from 
U.S. intervention. 
Presidents long argued that the “savage” Indians needed the benefits of civilization, 
sometimes speaking at length on the subject, as did Thomas Jefferson,61 and sometimes 
confining themselves to encapsulating long held cultural beliefs in simple sentences, as Ulysses 
S. Grant did in his inaugural: “The proper treatment of the original occupants of this land—the 
Indians—is one deserving of careful study. I will favor any course toward them which tends to 
their civilization and ultimate citizenship.”62 The cultural assumptions here were clear: Indians 
lacked the civilization that was a prerequisite for citizenship. It was up to the national 
government to train them in the ways of civilized nations. This summary was possible because of 
the long history of this version of American relations with indigenous peoples. John Quincy 
Adams laid out that history as clearly as any president: 
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The attention of Congress is particularly invited to that part of the report of the Secretary 
 of War which concerns the existing system of our relations with the Indian tribes. At the 
 principle was adopted of considering them as foreign and independent powers and also as 
 proprietors of lands. They were, moreover, considered as savages, whom it was our 
 policy and our duty to use our influence in converting to Christianity and in bringing 
 within the pale of civilization. . . . We have been far more successful in the acquisition of 
 their lands than in imparting to them the principles or inspiring them with the spirit of 
 civilization.63 
American national policy, as articulated here by Adams and as understood by every president at 
least into to the late twentieth century, rests on a complicated understanding of Indians as 
sovereign and childlike and savage. As sovereigns, they could reassign their land to the U.S. 
government. As children, they could be directed toward the path of civilization.64 As savages, 
that direction must sometimes require force. Because they were presumed to be ignorant, they 
did not always understand the benefits the U.S. was bringing to them and were thus sometimes 
hostile to American actions. The mature response was to understand that this hostility was the 
result of ignorance on the part of most, and malice on the part of their leadership and to act 
accordingly—teaching where possible, making war when necessary. Rutherford B. Hayes, for 
instance, noted in his first annual message to Congress that,  
After a series of most deplorable conflicts—the successful termination of which, while 
reflecting honor upon the brave soldiers who accomplished it, can not (sic) lessen our 
regret at their occurrence—we are now at peace with all the Indian tribes within our 
borders. . . Whatever may be said of their character and savage propensities, of the 
difficulties of introducing among them the habits of civilized life, and of the obstacles 
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they have offered to the progress of settlement and enterprise in certain parts of the 
country, the Indians are certainly entitled to our sympathy and to a conscientious respect 
on our part for their claims upon our sense of justice.   . . . We cannot expect them to 
improve and to follow our guidance unless we keep faith with them in respecting the 
rights they possess, and unless, instead of depriving them of their opportunities, we lend 
them a helping hand.65 
Conflict with the Indians, now, in Hayes’s view, successfully concluded, could be understood as 
“deplorable,” a cause for “regret.” But that conflict had paved the way, despite the Indians’ 
“savage propensities” for the introduction of civilization to these savages, provided Americans 
were there to offer “a helping hand.” First, the nation had to pacify the savages. That 
accomplished, they could then be trained and educated in the ways of civilization, leading to a 
successful conclusion for all parties—the Indians may have lost their land, but they gained 
civilization. Denizens of the U.S. gained territory and fulfilled their responsibility toward those 
whose “guardians” they had become.  
Similarly, the U.S was forced to combat terrorists, who, willfully or not, misunderstood 
American beneficence. Presidential rhetoric justifying the War on Terror, for example, rests 
heavily in the claim that terrorists are ignorant or venal. They hate the U.S. because of its 
freedom. Bush said that the U.S. was targeted on 9/11 because “we’re the brightest beacon for 
freedom and opportunity in the world.”66 Terrorists attack and plot against the U.S. because of its 
“democratically elected government,” its “freedom of religion,” its “freedom of speech,” its 
“freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.”67 It was the very goodness and 
civilization of the United States that lured terrorists to attack.68 
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 Wartime presidents in general argue that this inherent goodness of the U.S. and the way it 
governs should be exported to the savage enemy, for the sake of both the enemy and the U.S.69 
Because terrorists live in societies in which they are not free, according to Bush and Obama, they 
act out violently. As in the Indian Wars, contemporary presidents argue “terrorists’” imperfect 
understanding is a product of their lack of civilization, and that they must be subdued so they can 
be educated and brought into the civilized world. This process involves force. Like Indians, 
terrorists are willing to fight to defend an inappropriate way of life. Indians sought to protect 
their wild, nomadic existence; terrorists “seek to impose and expand an empire of oppression in 
which a tiny group of brutal, self-appointed rulers control every aspect of every life.” 70 The 
battlefield, in Bush’s articulation, is comprised of savage aggressors opposed to civilization. 
Free people, on the other hand, “are not drawn to violent and malignant ideologies,” and 
they “choose a better way when they’re given a chance.”71 Thus, it is in the interest of both the 
terrorists and the U.S. for the U.S. to invade countries and spread democracy. The U.S. brings 
democracy in order to save itself from being harmed by terrorists as well as to save the terrorists 
from themselves. Bush offered one of his common sentiments in his 2002 State of the Union 
when he said that because of terrorists, “freedom is at risk,” and the U.S. “will not allow it.”72 To 
work toward freedom in other countries advances “our own security interests by helping 
moderates and reformers and brave voices for democracy.”73 While terrorists try to build fascist 
empires, according to Bush and Obama, the U.S. does something completely different in its 
promotion of democracy. Bush said that the main difference between the U.S. and its enemies is 
that “the United States has no right, no desire, and no intention to impose our form of 
government on anyone else… because democracies respect their own people and their neighbors, 
the advance of freedom will lead to peace.” 74 American violence was a civilizing force.  
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 Moreover, as in the Indian Wars, eventual democratization and/or civilization is a part of 
God’s divine will, which is inherently inevitable, pure, and good. Bush argues that 
democratization is indeed taking place: women are voting in Afghanistan, Palestinians are 
“choosing a new direction,” and the Ukraine has elected a president. 75 The coming years, Bush 
said, would only “add to that story” of democratization. 76 God Himself has “planted in every 
human heart the desire to live in freedom,” and that desire will win out in the end. 77 “Human 
dignity,” Obama said in 2012, “cannot be denied.” 78 That dignity can only come from freedom 
and democracy. 
Interestingly, neither president was willing to negotiate with terrorists; civilization and 
democracy cannot be brought to them peacefully. Terrorists must be eliminated, violently of 
necessary. By killing the terrorists, however, the people under their control are free to reap the 
benefits of civilization.  The rhetoric of civilization is also a rhetoric that justifies armed conflict, 
for savages must be subdued in order to be brought into the circle of democratic nations. They 
rebel against this process either out of ignorance or malice. The cause ultimately does not matter, 
for the process is the same: render the needy enemy physically powerless so that they can be 
subject to the dictates of a democratic education. For Indians, that process meant forced 
relocation and incarceration on reservations and in boarding schools where the object was, in 
school superintendent Richard Pratt’s famous phrase, to “destroy the Indian and save the man.”79 
In the case of terrorists, it has meant war as the means for “democracy promotion.” In both cases, 
war has been justified as the appropriate response to an amorphous and threatening enemy, who 
makes shifting alliances along diffuse borders, requiring massive force and the leadership of a 
strong executive who has both the morality implicit in claims to civilization and explicit in its 
superior technology to command. War is not the preferred means of action, but when necessary it 
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is authorized as generative of a democratic civilization, the instantiation of God’s will in the 
world.   
Racialized War 
 
 We know a great deal about how war rhetoric operates in general, and, as numbers of 
scholarly studies have ably demonstrated, the rhetoric in the War on Terror can be usefully 
understood through the lens of genre. But that genre may work a bit differently when it is used in 
reference to non-white enemies, and it thus also useful to isolate the specifically racialized 
versions of war rhetoric. Such isolation allows us to focus on the ways in which racial 
hierarchies are confirmed at home and promulgated abroad.  
 War is a blunt instrument. It is made more so by rhetoric so steeped in ideology that its 
consequences are both pervasive and hidden. In the Indian Wars and in the War on Terror, 
presidential rhetoric purveys a specific sense of the national self so ingrained in the national 
culture that it works almost invisibly, making its assumptions difficult to contest. In both cases, 
that rhetoric wields generality instead of specificity, rendering images of the enemy in ways that 
both magnifies the threat and conceals differences in motivation as well as behavior. By 
presenting enemies as an inchoate mass operating along a shifting and perilous border, deftly 
able to form and reform allegiances, continued force is justified as the only appropriate response. 
In both sets of wars, inchoate and massively threatening enemies are characterized by their 
primitiveness and represented by their lack of technology, which operates as a metonym for 
civilization. The enemy in each case is depicted as deficient of basic elements of honor; they lack 
a commitment to the rules of war and cannot be trusted. As an inevitable consequence of these 
depictions, war itself is justified as a civilizing force, bringing the benefits of the American 
version of democracy to those whose savagery threatens that system. Americans are happy to 
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offer democracy to all: the nation is, after all, understood by itself as a “city on a hill,” an 
example to the world. But if the world is not ready to accept that example, violent means can 
help them learn by it.   
 This essay brings to the fore specific ways a national understanding of race reveals itself in 
presidential war rhetoric, and the implications of the racial ordering within the rhetoric of the 
current global, amorphous War on Terror.80 Just as early mercantilism linked the “New World” 
and the “Old World” in a “common project of defining modern subjectivity in racial terms,” the 
designation of the term “tribe” to American Indians, along with Pacific Islanders, and Africans, 
positioned non-whites as lower on the evolutionary scale than nations and citizens”81 Deborah 
Thomas and M. Kamari Clarke note that the “construction of security as racialized discourse has 
been particularly evident in the post 9/11 period,” as a race-ing of Muslims, in the U.S. and 
abroad, constitutes criminalization.”82 The disciplining of Muslims as raced threats follows the 
path set by the U.S. in the American Indian Wars. Local constructions and disciplining of race 
affects and reflects global understanding of race. Use of race as a mechanism for discipline, such 
as in the War on Terror, likewise affects the treatment of racialized subjects in the U.S.83  
 Focusing on these sets of prolonged wars highlights the ways this rhetoric is focused on 
maintaining national racial hierarchies by disciplining non-white bodies. Historically, the U.S. 
has a vastly different way of responding to white “enemies” than it does to non-whites, or those 
who have white privilege and those who do not. White actors are considered individuals who 
committed crimes, and as exceptions to the “rule,” while non-white persons are understood to 
have an all-assuming identity that makes them inherent threats. The prevailing version of U.S. 
civic republicanism excludes non-whites from those fit to self-govern, thus energizing and 
validating paternalistic U.S. foreign policy.84 Non-whites are consistently amalgamated and 
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connected to an ideology that is different than the pervasive and hidden ideology of whiteness, 
which marks the U.S., and which justifies systematic surveillance, war, and other forms of 
discipline against those who are not white.85 We think of foreign and domestic policies as parts 
of different domains of politics, but the rationales that characterize one domain can and do affect 
the ways we perceive the other domain. The U.S. has always exerted rhetorical means of policing 
the borders of citizenship; the rhetoric used to justify extended wars becomes part of the ways in 
which those borders are protected at home. 
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